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Coral reefsTo investigate a potential relationship betweenﬁnancial andmarine resource use decisions, we conducted a time
preference experiment with 153 ﬁshers and 197 SCUBA divers on Curaçao and Bonaire. The experimentwas part
of a socioeconomic survey wherein interviewees were asked about their ﬁshing and diving practices, views on
ﬁsh population and coral reef health, and preferred marine resource management approaches. We use a
βδ-model to identify discounting and present bias. Divers had a mean individual discount factor (IDF) of
0.91, signiﬁcantly higher than ﬁshers' mean of 0.82. Fishers and divers had similar distributions of IDFs and pres-
ent bias; overall 66% of intervieweeswere non-biased, 22% future-biased, and 12% present-biased. IDFs and pres-
ent bias were able to predict management preferences after controlling for demographic factors. However, the
effect of discount factors is unique to divers, and the effect of present bias is concentrated among ﬁshers on
Curaçao. Differences in time preferences between ﬁshers and divers should be considered when developing
management strategies. Transfer payments from the dive industry could facilitate a transition to sustainable ﬁsh-
ing practices. Establishing property rights alone may not be sufﬁcient for ensuring sustainability if ﬁshers are
present-biased and greatly discount the future.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.Open access under CC BY-NC-SA license.1. Introduction
Individuals' time preferences (here discounting and present bias)
have been extensively researched as they pertain to demographic char-
acteristics and ﬁnancial decisions (Frederick et al., 2002). Recently, the-
ories describing how individuals conceive of decisions and tradeoffs
have begun to be applied more expansively, and research has consid-
ered the environmental implications of time preferences (Hardisty
and Weber, 2009). Much of the environmental research to date has
focused on how social discounting could inﬂuence policies for mitigat-
ing global warming (reviewed in Carson and Roth Tran, 2009). Less
research has focused on the marine realm, although notable exceptions
include applications of time preference concepts to marine protected
area design (Grafton et al., 2005; Sanchirico et al., 2006) and to ecosys-
tem restoration (Sumaila, 2004). Research on the relationship betweenonnecticut Ave. NW, Floor 3,
son).
not discount rates. For clarity,
wo are related by the equation
.Open access under CC BY-NC-SA licenthe discount factors2 of individuals and the management of marine
resources is sparse.
Open access problems aside, we hypothesize that individuals with
higher discount factors and less present biaswith regard toﬁnancial de-
cisions (i.e., those who value the future more highly) would also be
more inclined towards resource conservation (i.e., marine reserves
and less damaging types of ﬁshing gear). Conversely, one might expect
that individuals with lower discount factors and more present bias
would be more inclined towards unsustainable levels of resource ex-
ploitation. Little empirical work has focused on this theory as pertains
to ﬁsheries management. Substantially more research has addressed
the risk preferences of ﬁshers (Bockstael and Opaluch, 1983; Eggert
and Lokina, 2007; Eggert and Martinsson, 2004; Eggert and Tveteras,
2004; Mistiaen and Strand, 2000; Opaluch and Bockstael, 1984; Smith
and Wilen, 2005) than the time preferences of ﬁshers.
To our knowledge, only two published studies present ﬁshers' dis-
count factors. Both of those studies elicited individual discount factors
(IDFs) using hypothetical choices between various ﬁsheriesmanagement2 Throughout the paper, we refer to discount factors, not discount rates. For clarity,
if ρ is the discount rate and δ is the discount factor, the two are related by the equation
δ = (1 + ρ)−1.
se.
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regimes (Akapalu, 2008; Curtis, 2002). There do not appear to be any
published studies presenting time preferences elicited from SCUBA di-
vers. Thus, the research presented here represents the ﬁrst attempt to
elicit ﬁshers' and divers' time preferences using incentivized experiments
(i.e., price lists associated with actual monetary payments), and further,
to explore the relationships between experimentally-measured discount
factors and stated resource management preferences.
We elicited time preferences from ﬁshers and professional SCUBA di-
vers onCuraçao andBonaire, islands in the southeastern Caribbean. Those
professions were targeted because both are ﬁnancially dependent on the
health of ocean resources — ﬁshers for the abundance of their catches,
and professional divers for attracting tourist clientele. These neighboring
islands are former Dutch colonies with similar histories of resource ex-
ploitation and similar marine ecosystems. The time preference experi-
ment was paired with a socioeconomic interview that included
questions on ﬁshing and diving practices, perceptions of ﬁsh population
trends and coral reef health, and level of support formanagement options
such as gear restrictions and marine reserves. Here, we evaluate time
preferences, aswell as demographic characteristics, to understandﬁshers'
and divers' preferred strategies for managing coral reefs.
2. Methods
2.1. Socioeconomic Interviews
In fall of 2009 on Curaçao, and spring of 2010 on Bonaire, A.E.J. con-
ducted in-person interviews with (full and part-time) ﬁshers and pro-
fessional SCUBA divers (i.e., dive instructors and divemasters). There
are no records listing the ﬁshers or divers on either island, so stratiﬁed
random sampling of these groups was not possible. Instead, interviews
were opportunistic, as exhaustive as possible, and as inclusive as possi-
ble of all demographic groups. Interviewees were identiﬁed via recom-
mendations from local contacts, approaching individuals at ﬁshing
docks and in dive shops, and requesting the contact information for ad-
ditional individuals at the end of each interview in what is termed a
snowball sampling technique (Bernard, 1994). All divers were ﬂuent
or nearly ﬂuent in English, and a Papiamento–Dutch–English translator
was used for all ﬁsher interviews.
A total of 388 interviewswere conducted: 126 ﬁshers on Curaçao, 51
ﬁshers on Bonaire, 112 divers on Curaçao, and 99 divers on Bonaire.
Based on the number of interviews, the number of potential inter-
viewees identiﬁed but withwhom itwas not possible to schedule inter-
views, and general knowledge of the ﬁshing and diving communities,
we estimate that there are approximately 200 ﬁshers on Curaçao, 80
ﬁshers on Bonaire, 120 professional divers on Curaçao, and 130 profes-
sional divers on Bonaire as of 2010. Based on these estimates, our sam-
ple represented 63% and 65% of the ﬁshers on Curaçao and Bonaire
respectively, and 86% and 83% of the divers on Curaçao and Bonaire
respectively.
Of the interviewees, eight ﬁshers and ﬁve divers declined to partici-
pate in the time preference experiment because they refused to have
their participation in the interview be at all associated with a monetary
payment. Nine ﬁshers and eleven divers had multiple switch points in
one or more price lists. Because such responses imply either that this
is an inappropriate approach for measuring IDFs for those interviewees,
or that they did not properly understand the questions, those individ-
uals are not included in this analysis. Five ﬁshers did not provide full de-
mographic information. Thus, here we only examine the responses of
153 ﬁshers and 197 divers.
2.2. Eliciting Time Preferences
Methods for eliciting time preferences have become well-honed,
and the research presented here utilizes the best techniques currently
available in attempt to capture the most accurate responses (Collerand Williams, 1999). Price lists (sets of questions offering choices
between receiving payments sooner and later) accompanied by real
monetary payments were used to elicit time preferences. At the end of
each socioeconomic interview, participants were asked twenty-one
questions — three price lists were used, each with seven questions
(Appendix A). All price lists presented choices between sooner, smaller
payments, and later, larger payments. Payments ranged from twenty to
ﬁfty ﬂorins (Fl.; 1 USD= Fl. 1.75). This maximumpayment of Fl. 50was
chosen because it is roughly equivalent to a ﬁsher or diver's daily
income, thus one would not expect participants to be indifferent be-
tween payment choices. Additionally, it is a denomination of the local
currency, so participants should have been familiar with its purchasing
power, yet the amount is not so high as to make the experiment cost
prohibitive.
The quantities ofmoney offeredwere consistent across price lists. All
sooner payments ranged from Fl. 50 down to Fl. 20, while all later pay-
ments were held constant at Fl. 50. The sole difference among the price
lists was the dates at which payments were to be distributed. The ﬁrst
price list contained choices between payments the upcoming Friday
and payments two weeks from Friday. The second price list contained
choices between payments Friday and one month from Friday. The
third price list contained choices between payments two weeks from
Friday and a month from Friday. The experiment instructions and all
questions were read aloud to interviewees.
To encourage careful consideration of responses, each interviewee
was offered a cash payment in accordance with their answer to one of
the twenty-one time preference questions. After responding to all ques-
tions, participants pick a numbered chip from a sack, and the quantity of
their payment was determined based on how they answered the ques-
tion correspondingwith the number on the chip. For example, an inter-
viewee who chose the chip marked with number seven, and who in
response to question seven chose to receive Fl. 50 two weeks from
Friday over Fl. 20 on Friday, would then actually be given Fl. 50 two
weeks from Friday.
We employed front end delays (i.e., no payments were made at the
timeof interview) to equate the transaction costs of choosing the sooner
and later payments, and to reduce the dependence of responses on level
of trust for the researcher (Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008). All inter-
viewees were required to retrieve their payments at a speciﬁed future
date, time, and location. On Curaçao, we distributed payments on Friday
afternoons at Dienst Landbouw, Veeteelt & Visserij (LVV), where the
ﬁsheries department is located. On Bonaire, we distributed payments
on Friday afternoons at the ofﬁce of Stichting Nationale Parken
(STINAPA), the headquarters of the island's marine park. Each inter-
viewee was given a card stating the date and time that their payment
could be picked up along with directions to the payment distribution
location.
2.3. Calculating Discount Factors and Present Bias
For the point in each price list where the participant switched from
preferring the sooner to preferring the later payment (i.e. the switch
point), we took the mean between the sooner payment amounts in
the question before the switch and in the question where the switch
was made. The mean is used, as is common practice, because price list
questions do not enable the determination of the exact switch point,
rather the discrete range within which the switch occurs. We then di-
vided that mean by Fl. 50, the highest payment option in each question,
yielding discount factors from≥1.0 down to 0.4 (Table 1). For example,
a participant chooses sooner payments over later payments in response
to all price list questions until asked to choose between Fl. 50 in two
weeks from Friday and Fl. 20 on Friday, and at that point chooses to
wait two weeks to receive Fl. 50. He would have a mean switch point
of 25 (the mean of the Fl. 30 and Fl. 20 sooner payment amounts be-
tween which the switch was made), which when divided by 50 yields
a discount factor of 0.5.
Table 1
Price list switch points with their associated midpoints, discount factors, and frequency of ﬁsher and diver responses.
Interview responses elicited Midpoint between switch questions Discount Factor # of ﬁsher responses # of diver responses
Prefers Fl. 50 later over Fl. 50 sooner 50 ≥1.0 31 58
Prefers Fl. 50 sooner over Fl. 50 later 49 0.98 54 80
Prefers Fl. 48 sooner over Fl. 50 later 46 0.92 10 16
Prefers Fl. 44 sooner over Fl. 50 later 42 0.84 7 17
Prefers Fl. 40 sooner over Fl. 50 later 37.5 0.75 20 13
Prefers Fl. 35 sooner over Fl. 50 later 32.5 0.65 6 5
Prefers Fl. 30 sooner over Fl. 50 later 25 0.5 7 6
Prefers Fl. 20 sooner over Fl. 50 later 20 ≤0.4 24 10
132 A.E. Johnson, D.K. Saunders / Ecological Economics 100 (2014) 130–139A participant who chose later payments in response to all questions,
even when given the choice between Fl. 50 on Friday and Fl. 50 in
2 weeks, would have a discount factor of 50/50, which we notate as
≥1.0 because it cannot be assigned an upper bound. A participant
who chose sooner payments in response to all questions would have a
discount factor of 20/50, which we notate as ≤0.4 because it cannot
be assigned a lower bound. These bounds cannot be determined be-
cause the price lists did not include enough questions to determine
switch points for these participants.
We consider time preferences using a three period βδ-model:
Ui c0; c1; c2ð Þ ¼ ui c0ð Þ þ βδui c1ð Þ þ βδ2ui c2ð Þ:
In this model, β = 1 corresponds to the standard exponential
discountingmodel, while β≠ 1 represents hyperbolic time preferences
(i.e., changes in discount rates over time). Period zero refers to the up-
coming Friday, while period one refers to two weeks from Friday, and
period two refers to four weeks from Friday. Individual discount factors
(IDF)were calculated based on participant responses to questions in the
three price lists: IDF1, IDF2, and IDF3 correspond with price lists one,
two, and three, respectively. Within this context, our elicited discount
factors relate to the model parameters as follows:Discount factors Model parametersIDF1 βδ
IDF2 βδ2IDF3 δWithin theβδ-framework, IDF3 yields themost directmeasure of the
discount factor, δ, so we exclusively use IDF3 when analyzing the effect
of discount factors on management preferences. To examine the role of
hyperbolic discounting, individuals were categorized as present-biased,
future-biased, or non-biased (pure exponential) based on the deﬁni-
tions from the underlying model. Speciﬁcally, we use the relationship
between IDF1 and IDF3 to impute β, since these are the IDFs calculated
from price lists with two-week differences in payment dates, but with
IDF3 having an additional two-week front-end delay.Time preferences Value of β Relation of IDFsPresent-biased β b 1 IDF1 b IDF3
Non-biased (exponential) β= 1 IDF1 = IDF3
Future-biased β N 1 IDF1 N IDF3Individuals for whom IDF1 was smaller than IDF3 are considered
present-biased, since this implies hyperbolic discounting, i.e., β b 1.
Individuals for whom IDF1 was larger than IDF3 are considered future-
biased, i.e., β N 1. Individuals for whom IDF1 is equal to IDF3 are consid-
ered non-biased, corresponding to the standard model of exponential
discounting.2.4. Eliciting Management Preferences
As part of the larger interview, all participants were asked their
opinions of a variety of marine resource management options (see
Appendix B). Questionswere focused onﬁshing gear restrictions (i.e., re-
quiring modiﬁcations to certain types of ﬁshing gear or banning gear
types all together) and area restrictions (i.e., temporary or permanent
no ﬁshing or no diving reserves). Marine reserves, where ﬁshing is
prohibited, are a scientiﬁcally proven way to increase ﬁsh populations,
restore habitat, and improve catches in surrounding areas (PISCO, 2007).
Using thenine gear questions and seven reserve questions, gear scores
and reserves scores were calculated for each individual based on the per-
centage of gear restrictions and area restrictions that they supported.
Using responses to gear and reserve questions and ﬁve additional miscel-
laneous management questions (i.e., restricting numbers of ﬁshers and
divers, and prohibitions on anchoring, catch of certain species, and
catch of juvenile ﬁsh), an overall conservation score was calculated for
each individual. The maximum value for each score is 100 (i.e., all re-
sponses favoring restrictions on use and increased resource protection)
and the minimum value is zero.
2.5. Revealed Management Preferences
Questions on limiting the number of ﬁshers and divers, closing areas
to ﬁshing or diving, and restrictions on types of ﬁshing gear are used to
explore interviewees willingness to have their own usage constrained,
that is, their revealed management preferences. The most commonly
used types of ﬁshing gear on these islands are hook-and-line, trolling,
ﬁsh traps, spearguns, gill nets, and beach seines. Hook-and-line and
trolling generally cause less environmental harm (e.g., habitat damage,
bycatch of juveniles and non-target species) than do ﬁsh traps, spear-
guns, gills nets, and beach seines. Thus, we term the former low-
impact gears, and the latter high-impact gears. Low-impact gears have
high risk of zero catch, but also a chance of valuable catch; they tend
to catch low numbers of high-value species. High-impact gears have
low risk of zero catch, are often less time intensive per kilogram caught
(traps and nets need not be constantly attendedwhile they are ﬁshing),
and have greater catch quantity, but with catch often (with the notable
exception of spearguns) comprised of lower-value species.
2.6. Data Analysis
We conduct a variety of regressions in order to estimate the impact
of time preferences on attitudes towards management. Our model for
each management score (denoted Score) takes the form:
Score ¼ α þ ϕ1IDF3 þ ϕ2IDF3  Fisher þ θ1Present þ θ2Present  Fisher
þθ3Present  CuracSaoþ θ4Present  Fisher  CuracSaoþ x
0
λþ ϵ
where IDF3 measures the exponential discount factor, δ; Present is a
dummy variable denoting present-biased time preferences, β b 1; Fisher
is a dummy variable denoting ﬁshers; Curaçao is a dummy variable
denoting residents of Curaçao; and x is a vector of demographic control
variables. Within x are additional dummy variables, several continuous
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dummy variables are for profession, location, marriage status, parent-
hood, possession of a bank account, access to credit, and employment
status (i.e., full-time, part-time, hobby). The continuous variables are
for age, years of experience, and a quadratic relation for the number of
generations that one's family has ﬁshed/dived. Lastly, to add more ﬂex-
ibility to the model, we also control for interactions between profession
and island, profession and marriage status, and profession and posses-
sion of bank account.
We employ one large model to allow the effects of discount factors
and present bias to vary by group, and to avoid the loss of statistical
power associated with reductions in sample size. We denote the effect
of IDF as ϕ1 for divers and ϕ1 + ϕ2 for ﬁshers. Likewise, we denote the
effect of present bias as θ1 for divers on Bonaire, θ1 + θ2 for ﬁshers on
Bonaire, θ1 + θ3for divers on Curaçao, and θ1 + θ2 + θ3 + θ4 for ﬁshers
on Curaçao. For robustness, we estimate a few alternative restrictions to
this ﬂexible model, such as applying a uniform effect of discount factors
(ϕ2=0) or present bias (θ2+ θ3+ θ4=0) onmanagement preferences,
or allowing the effect of present bias to vary by profession (θ3 + θ4= 0),
island (θ2+ θ4= 0), or both (θ4= 0). Under the full model, the effect
of IDF varies by profession, while present bias has four, independent
effects for each profession–island pairing.
2.7. Risk-aversion
Any experiment involving time preferences must take care to
address uncertainty and risk aversion. Our use of a front-end delay for
all payments controls for changes in risk preferences within an individ-
ual due to the certainty of payments in the current period versus the
uncertainty of payments in future periods (Andreoni and Sprenger,
2012). However, theory posits that a longer length to maturity of any
payment is inherently riskier, and the yield curve (i.e., the fact that in-
terest rates tend to rise with the length to maturity) is often cited as
an example of this effect. The future is deemed riskier because there is
some increasing probability that the payment will not be received.
This reﬂects increasing riskiness of the asset, not increasing risk aver-
sion of the individual, over the length to maturity. Recent research on
the U.S. treasuries (Startz and Tsang, 2012) suggests that the majority
of the yield curve is explained by pure hyperbolic discounting, not
risk. That is, what appears as an aversion to increasing risk over time-
to-maturity is, in fact, increasing impatience with longer waiting pe-
riods. Hence, it may be sufﬁcient to control for present bias, which we
do, without also controlling for risk aversion.
Theory gives us further reason to believe that we have successfully
identiﬁed the effect of present bias in particular. While heterogeneous
risk preferences may affect observed discount factors (δ) and, hence,
observed hyperbolic discount factors (β), it does not affect whether hy-
perbolic discounting is observed on the extensive margin, that is,
whether our dummy variable Present equals zero or one. Additionally,
the time to payment is quite short (four weeks at most), which explains
the large proportion of discount factors observed between 0.98 and 1,
and mitigates concern over payoff uncertainty. Thus, we are conﬁdent
that our results identify individual discount factors and hyperbolic
discounting separately from risk preferences.
3. Results and Discussion
3.1. Interviewee Demographics
The mean age of interviewed ﬁshers was 48.0 years, signiﬁcantly
older than divers, for whom the mean age was 36.6 (p b 0.001,
Table 2). Fishers were more likely than divers to be married (p =
0.005) and to have children (p b 0.001). Of the married inter-
viewees, divers were more likely than ﬁshers to have an employed
spouse (p b 0.001). Proportions of ﬁshers and of divers who were
married, had children, and/or had an employed spouse did not differsigniﬁcantly between islands. Fishers had more years of personal expe-
rience and more generations of family experience with ﬁshing than
divers had with diving (both p b 0.001).
Divers were signiﬁcantlymore ﬁnancially secure than ﬁshers, asmea-
sured by their greater likelihood of having a bank account, a credit card,
and a friend who would loan them Fl. 50 (all p b 0.001). Of the partici-
pants who could borrow Fl. 50 from a friend, ﬁshers were signiﬁcantly
more likely to have to pay interest on such a loan (p b 0.001).
Professional divers frequently work in the dive industry to temporarily
support themselves while living abroad, tend to bemore educated than
ﬁshers, and oftenhavehigher-paying jobs that they can return to and/or
family members (parents or spouses) to provide ﬁnancial assistance
while they pursue professional diving. Mean annual incomes of inter-
viewees were approximately Fl. 22,100 ($12,486 USD), and not signiﬁ-
cantly different between professions or islands. However, because
income data were self-reported and 125 interviewees (35%) chose not
to respond to this question, income data are not used further in the
present analysis to avoid potential effects such as sample selection bias.
To summarize the demographics, professional divers are general-
ly younger, unmarried, without children, white, foreign (mostly
Dutch), and more ﬁnancially secure, with less personal and family
history in their ﬁeld than ﬁshers. In contrast, ﬁshers are generally
older, married, parents, black, Antillean, less ﬁnancially secure, and
more experienced. Diver demographics likely remain fairly consis-
tent over time despite high turnover within the professional diving
community. Turnover of ﬁshers is low, although the proportion of
time that an individual allocates to ﬁshing often varies seasonally
and inter-annually based upon the catch and the availability of alter-
native employment opportunities.
3.2. Fisher and Diver IDFs
Themajority of ﬁshers and divers appear to have relatively high dis-
count factors. However, ﬁshers' discount factors were signiﬁcantly
lower than those of divers. Mean IDF3 for ﬁshers was 0.82 (SE 0.019)
compared to 0.91 (SE 0.011) for divers (Table 2). Divers were signiﬁ-
cantly more likely than ﬁshers to choose the later payment even when
the sooner and later payment amounts were both Fl. 50, which results
in some IDFs of≥1.0 (p b 0.05 for all price lists; Fig. 1). Fishers were sig-
niﬁcantly more likely than divers to choose the sooner payment for all
questions in a price list (p b 0.002 for all price lists). For ﬁshers, IDF3
was positively correlated with having a bank account (p = 0.013).
Counter to our hypothesis, IDFs were not correlated with usage of
high-impact gear.
Although evidence in the literature for the correlation between pov-
erty and time preferences is mixed (Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008),
some research has identiﬁed a positive relationship between discount
factor and income (discussed in Carson and Roth Tran, 2009). Thus,
the results here could reﬂect the fact that divers generally have higher
expected lifetime incomes than ﬁshers, and a lower level of ﬁnancial
constraint.
Individuals largely offered similar responses across price lists. 15% of
ﬁshers and 27% of divers had the same switch point in all three price
lists. Consistency in switch points could be caused by individuals not
perceiving these lists as presenting substantially different choices. Larg-
er differences in days until payment (time periods on the order of six
months or a year) might have produced greater differentiation in re-
sponses between price lists, but could also have exacerbated any effect
of risk preferences.
3.3. Distribution of IDFs
The majority of both ﬁshers and divers have discount factors≥0.98,
however, the distribution of diver IDFs exhibits an essentiallymonoton-
ic decline from 1.0 down to ≤0.4 for all price lists, while that of ﬁshers
has a somewhat tri-modal distribution with additional peaks at 0.75,
Table 2
Meandemographic information, discount factors, present bias, andmanagement scores for interviewed ﬁshers and divers,with standard errors in parentheses. For “yes/no” categories, yes=1,
no = 0.
Fishers Divers
Island Curaçao Bonaire Overall Curaçao Bonaire Overall
Number of interviewees 109 44 153 106 91 197
Age 47.9
(1.23)
48.5
(2.89)
48.0
(1.20)
34.2
(0.89)
39.3
(1.31)
36.6
(0.79)
Years of experience 34.71
(1.24)
38.14
(2.74)
35.69
(1.19)
12.16
(0.83)
16.77
(1.18)
14.29
(0.72)
Generations of family ﬁshing/diving 3.14
(0.14)
3.41
(0.18)
3.22
(0.12)
1.34
(0.06)
1.37
(0.06)
1.36
(0.04)
Married 0.55
(0.05)
0.43
(0.08)
0.52
(0.04)
0.36
(0.05)
0.39
(0.05)
0.37
(0.03)
Children 0.80
(3.86)
0.71
(6.93)
0.77
(0.03)
0.26
(0.04)
0.26
(0.05)
0.26
(0.03)
Bank account 0.72
(0.04)
0.66
(0.07)
0.70
(0.04)
1.00
(0.00)
0.98
(0.02)
0.99
(0.01)
Credit card 0.50
(0.05)
0.41
(0.07)
0.48
(0.04)
0.66
(0.05)
0.70
(0.05)
0.68
(0.03)
IDF1 0.88
(0.02)
0.78
(0.03)
0.85
(0.02)
0.92
(0.01)
0.99
(0.02)
0.91
(0.01)
IDF2 0.83
(0.02)
0.69
(0.04)
0.79
(0.02)
0.90
(0.01)
0.89
(0.02)
0.90
(0.01)
IDF3 0.86
(0.02)
0.71
(0.04)
0.82
(0.02)
0.92
(0.01)
0.89
(0.02)
0.91
(0.01)
Present bias 0.16
(0.03)
0.07
(0.03)
0.13
(0.03)
0.12
(0.03)
0.10
(0.03)
0.11
(0.02)
Reserve score 28.90
(3.36)
52.04
(4.12)
35.77
(2.80)
64.80
(2.17)
74.65
(2.17)
69.35
(1.57)
Gear score 51.92
(1.87)
57.24
(3.91)
53.45
(1.75)
75.00
(1.98)
75.63
(2.52)
75.29
(1.57)
Conservation score 44.28
(1.53)
52.87
(3.18)
46.75
(1.45)
71.36
(1.36)
74.44
(1.68)
72.78
(1.07)
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participants in the sample. This cluster may be an artifact of the trunca-
tion of each price at the choice between Fl. 20 sooner and Fl. 50 later. If
the range of sooner payments had included amounts less than Fl. 20,
some participants may have chosen additional lower payments,
resulting in discount factors lower than 0.4, thus dispersing that peak.
The cluster of ﬁshers at an IDF of 0.75 represents approximately 10%
of participants. This concentration of responses, which corresponds
with a preference of Fl. 40 sooner over Fl. 50 later, but a preference of
Fl. 50 later over Fl. 35 sooner and, may bemeaningful and not an artifact
of the experimental design. Currency quantities are oftenmentally com-
pared against the value of oft purchased items, offering a potential ex-
planation for this peak. Polar, the most popular beer on both islands,
was priced from Fl. 36 to Fl. 38 per case at the time of this study, and
is one likely candidate for such a calibration. Although anecdotal and in-
adequate to prove correlation, ﬁve ﬁshers and one diver did explicitly
mention this as the rationale for their switch point.
3.4. Comparison With Previous IDF Studies
Despite the array of literature on measuring time preferences, and
due in part to widely varying elicitation methods, honing in on a
“normal” range of discount factors has been elusive. As compiled by
Frederick et al. (2002), seven studies published between 1978 and
2002 elicited discount factors using choice sets associated with real
monetary payments. Those studies produced a range of annual discount
factors from 0.0 to 1.01. The range of IDFs presented here, from≤0.4 to
≥1.0, is truncated due to the experimental design, hindering a direct
comparison with previous research.
The two previous studies that report experimentally measured dis-
count factors of ﬁshers found mean values substantially lower than
those presented here. Fishers in the Irish Sea had amean discount factor
of ~0.7 (Curtis, 2002), and ﬁshing boat skippers in Ghana had a mean
discount factor of 0.43 (Akapalu, 2008). These studies measured IDF
with questions about future proﬁt scenarios that would result fromdifferent ﬁshery management approaches. Because those two studies
used different elicitation methods than the price list approach used
here, unfortunately it cannot be determined whether the higher dis-
count factors we measured are indicative of important differences in
cultural, economic, or ﬁsheries management contexts.
Another confounding factor when comparing discount rates is time
period. Broadly, there is the question of determining the appropriate
time horizon for considering the relationship of time preferences with
ocean management decisions, given that costs are often incurred in
the near-term, while beneﬁts accrue at an unknown rate in the future.
That said, we found sufﬁcient variation in discount factors within our
two-to-four week time period to explain management preferences
(Table 3). The weak incentives implied by a short time horizon should
onlymake signiﬁcant results harder toﬁnd. Further, longer timeperiods
to payment increase the potential for participants to factor uncertainty
of payment into their decision-making, which could confound time
preferences. Hence, we are satisﬁed that the time period we used is suf-
ﬁcient to meaningfully explain management preferences.
3.5. Present Bias
Distributions of hyperbolic discounting were not signiﬁcantly differ-
ent between professions or islands (Table 2). Contrary to our hypothe-
sis, ﬁshers who use high-impact gear did not exhibit a higher
incidence of present bias. Two-thirds of both ﬁshers and divers were
non-biased. An additional 22% of participants were future-biased, and
the remaining 12% were present-biased. As with IDF3 (Section 3.2),
the relatively low occurrence of present bias may represent consistency
across price lists that individuals perceived as functionally equivalent.
As for the large proportion of individuals exhibiting future bias, perhaps
individuals were using the experimental payment as a commitment de-
vice for saving. For example, one interviewee explained that although
he did not currently have a girlfriend, he might in two weeks, and if
he waited for the payment then he would have money to take her out
to dinner.
Fig. 1. Distributions of individual discount factors (IDFs) for ﬁshers and divers as elicited
via price lists with front-end delays and associated with real monetary payment. Price
lists had identical payment amounts but different pairs of payment dates.
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highly variable nature of ﬁsher and diver incomes, with ﬁshers depend-
ing on unpredictable catches and divers dependingpartly on tips. Future
bias could be related towhether the interviewee had recently received a
paycheck, whether divers had recently received a good tip, andwhether
ﬁshers recently had a good catch. Intervieweesmay also have been hes-
itant to admit a preference for receiving money sooner, due to pride.
This hesitation could have been exacerbated by the fact that the partic-
ipants were mostly male and the interviewer was a young female.
Indeed, decisions can be inﬂuenced by socio-cultural context, the desire
to appear competent, and the interview process itself, and therefore
may not solely reﬂect monetary preferences (e.g. Bowles, 1998; Levittand List, 2007). Regardless, future bias has no measurable impact on
management scores for any of the functional forms that we estimate.
Thus, it is included within the reference category, along with exponen-
tial discounting, in order to increase the statistical power of our mea-
surement of the effect of present bias.3.6. Management Scores
Mean gear scores, reserve scores, and conservation scores were sig-
niﬁcantly higher for divers than forﬁshers (all p b 0.001, Table 2). This is
not surprising, since divers beneﬁt from restrictions on ﬁshing, while
ﬁshers bear the bulk of costs for such restrictions. Without conditioning
on any control variables, IDF3 (Table 3) is positively correlated with re-
serve scores (R1, p = 0.068), gear scores (G1, p = 0.023), and conser-
vation scores (C1, p = 0.003). This is consistent with our hypothesis
thatmore patient individuals would show greater support for conserva-
tion efforts. Yet, when considering ﬁshers and divers collectively, after
controlling for other relevant factors by estimating our model with a
uniform effect of discount factors and present bias, there are no signiﬁ-
cant relationships between these scores and individual discount factors
(R2, G2, C2).
However, if we allow discount factors to have different effects for
ﬁshers and divers, but present bias is still restricted to one overall effect,
for ﬁshers there is still no effect, but we see that for divers (R3, G3, C3)
discount factors are signiﬁcant in explaining reserve scores (p= 0.007)
and conservation scores (p = 0.012), though not gear scores. A 0.1
point increase in the discount factor leads to a 2.5 point increase in re-
serve scores for divers, or an almost 15 point increase over the range
of observed discount factors. Similarly, for conservation scores a 0.1 in-
crease in the discount factor leads to a 1.8 point increase in conservation
scores for divers, or 10.8 points over the observed range. These results
are robust to the restrictions that we place on the effect of present
bias (R4, G4, C4). Since conservation scores are composed in part from
reserve scores and gear scores, the smaller effect of discount factors on
conservation scores is expected. The lack of an effect of discount factors
on gear scores is also expected, sincemarine reserve restrictions directly
affect inter-temporal decision-makingwhile gear restrictions have only
second-order inter-temporal effects (e.g., restricting high-impact gear
leads to improved future catches).
Present bias (Table 4) reduces marine reserve scores by almost 14
points (P1, p = 0.068), 7.4 points (P2, p = 0.040) after controlling for
demographic variables, but does not signiﬁcantly reduce gear scores
or conservation scores. That is, in support of our hypothesis, inter-
viewees who were more present biased were less supportive of marine
reserves. Gear scores are not responsive to present bias, thus washing
out an effect for overall conservation scores, even after controlling for
demographic variables. The effect of present bias on reserve scores is
stronger for ﬁshers than divers (P3, 9.7 versus 5.5), though not signiﬁ-
cant for either, and stronger on Curaçao than Bonaire (P4, 10.7 versus
0.26, p = 0.016). Model P5 estimates the effect of present bias across
professions and islands simultaneously, though the model assumes
that the difference between ﬁshers and divers is the same for each is-
land. The estimates suggest a combined effect that is signiﬁcant for
both ﬁshers (p = 0.049) and divers (p = 0.065) on Curaçao; though
present bias appears irrelevant on Bonaire. The ﬁnal model (P6),
which estimates a unique effect of present bias for each profession–
island combination, suggests that present bias only applies to ﬁshers
on Curaçao (p = 0.054). Given the relatively low statistical power
of these estimates (four parameters with 40 observations of present
bias), it is not clear whether the effect applies only to Curaçao ﬁshers,
or whether we lack the sample size required to parse the effect of
present bias across profession and location at the same time. Perhaps
these inter-island differences could be explained by the greater indus-
trialization and faster pace of life on Curaçao relative to Bonaire
(Wang et al., 2009).
Table 3
Marginal effect of individual discount factors (IDF3) on management scores by profession, with standard errors in parentheses.There are no signiﬁcant differences between islands.
All divers All ﬁshers
Reserve scores R1: Unconditional difference-in-means
ϕ2 = θ1 = θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = λ= 0
17.37⁎
(9.50)
17.37⁎
(9.50)
R2: Uniform effect for IDF and present bias
ϕ2 = θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = 0
7.09
(9.16)
7.09
(9.16)
R3: Uniform effect for present bias
θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = 0
25.30⁎⁎⁎(9.39) −6.31
(13.99)
R4: Full model 24.81⁎⁎⁎
(9.52)
−6.43
(14.17)
Gear scores G1: Unconditional difference-in-means
ϕ2 = θ1 = θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = λ= 0
14.87⁎⁎
(6.51)
14.87⁎⁎
(6.51)
G2: Uniform effect for IDF and present bias
ϕ2 = θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = 0
3.05
(6.55)
3.05
(6.55)
G3: Uniform effect for present bias
θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = 0
15.09
(11.84)
−5.82
(7.53)
G4: Full model 15.09
(11.93)
−6.45
(7.57)
Conservation Scores C1: Unconditional difference-in-means
ϕ2 = θ1 = θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = λ= 0
15.61⁎⁎⁎
(5.29)
15.61⁎⁎⁎
(5.29)
C2: Uniform effect for IDF and present bias
ϕ2 = θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = 0
4.06
(4.84)
4.06
(4.84)
C3: Uniform effect for present bias
θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = 0
18.30⁎⁎
(7.26)
−6.43
(6.29)
C4: Full model 18.05⁎⁎
(7.33)
−6.70
(6.33)
⁎ p b 0.10.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
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The design of the management scores was carefully tailored to best
measure the conservation preferences of participants. That said, these
key variables are constructed from survey responses; they are not
naturally occurring and passively observable. This is true not only of
conservation scores, which are composites of other created variables,
but also, more subtly, of reserve scores and gear scores. Therefore, as a
robustness check, we conduct a principal component analysis (PCA)
on the management scores and repeat our regression analysis using
the principal components as dependent variables.
We ﬁnd that the effects of discount factors and present bias operate
across distinct principal components. This result indicates that IDF3 and
Present are, indeed, measuring distinct aspects of time preferences. The
ﬁrst principal component is found to explain 76.9% of the variation
across management scores, while the second and third components ex-
plain 20.8% and 2.3% of the remaining variation, respectively. While the
units of the principal components, themselves, are not interpretable, the
relative size of the estimated effects makes for useful comparisons.Table 4
Marginal effect of present bias on marine reserve scores by profession and island, with standar
Bonaire divers
P1: Unconditional correlation
ϕ1 = ϕ2 = θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = λ= 0
−13.92⁎⁎⁎
(5.26)
P2: Uniform effect
θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = 0
−7.43⁎⁎
(3.60)
P3: Effect varies by profession
θ3 = θ4 = 0
−5.55
(4.24)
P4: Effect varies by island
θ2 = θ4 = 0
0.26
(5.52)
P5: Effect varies by profession and island
θ4 = 0
0.63
(5.97)
P6: Effect varies independently for each group −2.12
(6.69)
⁎ p b 0.10.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.The PCA results generally conﬁrm our other ﬁndings. Only the ﬁrst
principal component is signiﬁcantly affected by discount factors
(Table 5). When allowing the effect of discount factors to vary across
ﬁshers and divers, we ﬁnd that discount factors only impact the conser-
vation attitudes of divers (PCA-R3, PCA-R4). In Section 3.6, we showed
that discount factors impact both reserve scores and conservation
scores for divers. Therefore, it appears that themeasured effect for con-
servation scores merely represented the residual component of conser-
vation scores attributed to reserve scores.
The third principal component is the only dimension signiﬁcantly af-
fected by present bias (Table 6). Since the third component is the
weakest, this explains the difﬁculty in ﬁnding consistent results for
the effect on reserve scores. By isolating this component, we obtain
stronger results for present bias. Varying the effect of present bias
by profession (PCA-P3), this component is reduced by 0.11 for divers
(p= 0.028). Allowing the effect to differ across islands (PCA-P4),we es-
timate the reduction to be 0.12 on Bonaire (p = 0.016) and 0.10 on
Curaçao (p= 0.045). Allowing each profession-island to have a unique
present bias effect, we see that Curaçao ﬁshers' scores are reduced byd errors in parentheses.
Bonaire ﬁshers Curaçao divers Curaçao ﬁshers
−13.92⁎⁎⁎
(5.26)
−13.92⁎⁎⁎
(5.26)
−13.92⁎⁎⁎
(5.26)
−7.43⁎⁎
(3.60)
−7.43⁎⁎
(3.60)
−7.43⁎⁎
(3.60)
−9.71
(6.06)
−5.55
(4.24)
−9.71
(6.06)
0.26
(5.52)
−10.73⁎⁎
(4.42)
−10.73⁎⁎
(4.42)
−0.88
(7.46)
−9.91⁎⁎
(5.02)
−11.43⁎
(6.18)
7.17
(8.02)
−7.93
(5.44)
−13.11⁎
(6.77)
Table 5
Marginal effect of individual discount factor (IDF3) on the principal components of the management scores, with standard errors in parentheses. There are no signiﬁcant differences
between islands.
All divers All ﬁshers
Principal component 1
76.9% of total variation
PCA-R1: Unconditional difference-in-means
ϕ2 = θ1 = θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = λ= 0
1.10⁎⁎⁎
(0.40)
1.10⁎⁎⁎
(0.40)
PCA-R2: Uniform effect for IDF and present
bias ϕ2 = θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = 0
0.31
(0.35)
0.31
(0.35)
PCA-R3: Uniform effect for present bias
θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = 0
1.31⁎⁎
(0.53)
−0.43
(0.46)
PCA-R4: Full model 1.30⁎⁎
(0.53)
−0.46
(0.46)
Principal component 2
20.9% of total variation
PCA-G1: Unconditional difference-in-means
ϕ2 = θ1 = θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = λ= 0
−0.02
(0.24)
−0.02
(0.24)
PCA-G2: Uniform effect for IDF and present
bias ϕ2 = θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = 0
0.08
(0.27)
0.08
(0.27)
PCA-G3: Uniform effect for present bias
θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = 0
0.16
(0.39)
0.02
(0.38)
PCA-G4: Full model 0.15
(0.39)
0.03
(0.39)
Principal component 3
2.2% of total variation
PCA-C1: Unconditional difference-in-means
ϕ2 = θ1 = θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = λ= 0
−0.05
(0.07)
−0.05
(0.07)
PCA-C2: Uniform effect for IDF and present
bias ϕ2 = θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = 0
−0.01
(0.07)
−0.01
(0.07)
PCA-C3: Uniform effect for present bias
θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = 0
−0.06
(0.10)
0.04
(0.11)
PCA-C4: Full model −0.06
(0.10)
0.03
(0.11)
⁎ p b 0.10.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
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scores are reduced by 0.18 (p b 0.001), a far larger reduction than be-
fore. Thus, the PCA shows that our previous estimates lacked the statis-
tical power necessary to separate out the effects of present bias on
reserve scores across profession and island.We have conﬁrmed a strong
positive effect of discount factors, and a signiﬁcant negative effect of
present bias, on conservation attitudes. These effects are measured
across different principal components, so we are conﬁdent that the elic-
itation experiment separately identiﬁes these two dimensions of time
preference.3.8. Restricting Their Own Resource Use
We analyzed ﬁshers' and divers' comparative willingness to put re-
strictions on their own resource use. 1% of ﬁshers were willing to limit
the number of ﬁshers, whereas 34% of divers were willing to limit the
number of divers (p b 0.001).3 Fishers who used high-impact gears
(traps, spearguns, gill nets, seines) had signiﬁcantly lower marine re-
serve scores (p = 0.044), gear scores (p = 0.014), and conservation
scores (p = 0.037) than those who use low-impact gears (hook and
line, troll), reﬂecting reluctance not just on having restrictions placed
on their use of these gears, but on conservation measures in general.
Fishers were more likely than divers to support no diving areas and
vice versa for no ﬁshing areas (both p b 0.001). 62% percent of divers
supported no diving areas versus 37% of ﬁshers who supported no ﬁsh-
ing areas. On Bonaire, the same relationship holds as regards the
existing no ﬁshing and no diving areas, with ﬁshers more likely than di-
vers to support additional nodiving areas (p= 0.035) and vice versa for
no additional ﬁshing areas (p = 0.008). Divers on Bonaire were signif-
icantly more likely to support additional no diving areas (51% support)
than ﬁshers were to support additional no ﬁshing areas (32% support; p
b 0.05). Taken together, this is evidence of divers' greater patience with3 A restriction on the number of divers is likely to restrict the number of tourist divers,
and thereby the number of potential customers, but not necessarily the number of profes-
sional divers. A restriction on the number of ﬁshers could directly prevent interviewees
from ﬁshing.resource use relative to ﬁshers. To be fair, we are comparing a non-
extractive, recent profession dominated by foreigners (diving) with a
resource extractive profession with a long cultural history conducted
by locals who feel displaced (ﬁshing). There are likely complex socio-
cultural factors at play here. Regardless, divers focus on observing ma-
rine life and therefore beneﬁt from restrictions on ﬁshing, so these dif-
ferences in observed management preferences are to be expected to
some degree.
3.9. Key Findings
Fishers and divers had relatively high discount factors; however,
ﬁshers' IDFs were signiﬁcantly lower. The distribution of ﬁshers' IDFs
is somewhat trimodal (versus a monotonic decline for divers), perhaps
related to the salient purchasing power of particular dollar amounts.
Interestingly, divers' discount factors were positively related to their
view of marine reserves, though not with their views of gear restric-
tions. Discount factors appear unrelated to management scores for
ﬁshers.
Fishers who use high-impact gear did not exhibit the higher inci-
dence of present bias thatwe had anticipated. However, as expected, in-
terviewees who were more present biased were less supportive of
marine reserves, controlling for a host of demographic and economic
factors. An explanation for the high proportion of present-biased inter-
viewees cannot be determined from our data, but could be due to
income variability or socio-cultural factors.
Divers are overall more supportive of management measures than
ﬁshers, and, divers' responses support our hypothesis that individuals
who are more patient with money are more likely to support marine
reserves. Also as expected, ﬁshers who use high-impact gears are less
supportive of marine reserves. Interestingly, divers on Bonaire, where
there is a long history of marine protection, were the most supportive
of conservation measures.
3.10. Policy Implications
Fishers' relatively lower levels of ﬁnancial patience and support of
management measures that would contribute to long-term resource
Table 6
Marginal effect of present bias on the third principal component by profession and island, with standard errors in parentheses.
Bonaire divers Bonaire ﬁshers Curaçao divers Curaçao ﬁshers
PCA-P1: Unconditional difference-in-means
ϕ1 = ϕ2 = θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = λ= 0
−0.12⁎⁎⁎
(0.01)
−0.12⁎⁎⁎
(0.01)
−0.12⁎⁎⁎
(0.01)
−0.12⁎⁎⁎
(0.01)
PCA-P2: Uniform effect
θ2 = θ3 = θ4 = 0
−0.10⁎⁎
(0.04)
−0.10⁎⁎
(0.04)
−0.10⁎⁎
(0.04)
−0.10⁎⁎
(0.04)
PCA-P3: Effect varies by profession
θ3 = θ4 = 0
−0.11⁎⁎
(0.05)
−0.10
(0.59)
−0.11⁎⁎
(0.05)
−0.10
(0.59)
PCA-P4: Effect varies by island
θ2 = θ4 = 0
−0.12⁎⁎
(0.05)
−0.12⁎⁎
(0.05)
−0.10⁎⁎
(0.05)
−0.10⁎⁎
(0.05)
PCA-P5: Effect varies by profession and island
θ4 = 0
−0.13⁎⁎
(0.05)
−0.12
(0.09)
−0.10
(0.07)
−0.09
(0.06)
PCA-P6: Effect varies independently for each group −0.18⁎⁎⁎
(0.05)
0.05
(0.10)
−0.06
(0.08)
−0.13⁎⁎
(0.065)
⁎ p b 0.10.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
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approaches. Perhaps management of ﬁshing and diving should be
approached differently, with consideration of these inter-group differ-
ences in time preferences.
Our research suggests two options for applying our behavioral eco-
nomic results for increasing ﬁshery sustainability. First, policy could at-
tempt to shift ﬁshers' incentives towards conservation — perhaps with
transfer payments to offset the near-term expenses of switching to
low-impact gears, reducing ﬁshing effort, or adding marine reserves.
Since dive industry employees aremore patientﬁnancially, have greater
access to credit, exhibit higher valuations of conservation, and would
beneﬁt from constraints on ﬁshing, then perhaps they, or the dive in-
dustry more broadly, could offset the costs of altering ﬁshing behaviors.
Such anoffsetmay be particularly needed becauseﬁsherswhousehigh-
impact gears are less supportive of conservationmeasures (p= 0.037).
The notion of offsets is timely in the context of the dive fee that exists
on Bonaire and is being considered on Curaçao. Every individual who
dives or snorkels on Bonaire is required to buy an annual marine park
tag for 25 USD, the funds fromwhich are used for marine parkmanage-
ment. The idea for Curaçao is similar; an annual fee would be used to
fund enforcement of marine regulations. Utilizing a portion of these
funds to pay ﬁshers to reduce or cease the use of high-impact gears
could be a cost-effective conservation approach. For example, this
might be a mechanism for a buyout of the ﬁsh traps and nets that inﬂict
damage on shallow reef ecosystems, primarily catch herbivorous ﬁsh
(i.e. parrotﬁsh and surgeonﬁsh) critical for controlling algal growth,
and are deeply disliked by divers. Buyouts or other offsets, however,
would require substantial community buy-in and enforcement capacity.
Regarding community buy-in, there is an effect we call conservation
inertia. In addition to Bonaire having a dive fee, it also has no ﬁshing and
no diving areas, whereas Curaçao has none of these. These differences
seem to be associated with a dramatic inter-island difference in level
of support for marine reserves. No ﬁshing areas receive 52% support
on Curaçao versus 84% on Bonaire, and no diving areas receive 32% sup-
port on Curaçao versus 94% on Bonaire (both p b 0.001). Perhaps out of
familiarity, people on Bonaire are more supportive of reserves, whereas
people on Curaçaomay resist reserve establishment because the conse-
quences are unknown. Thus, gaining community support (especially
from ﬁshers) to put initial conservation measures in place may be a
challenge, but conservationist views may grow after measures are put
in place and beneﬁts are seen.
Second, establishing property rights may not alone be sufﬁcient for
conservation. Ownership is presumed to lead to improved resource
stewardship, and in recent years ﬁsheries economists have examined
the potential for property rights-based management approaches such
as cooperatives, individual transferable quotas (ITQs), and territorial
use rights in ﬁsheries (TURFs). However, present bias can lead to
over-consumption of resources in the present despite the incentive forsustainable use that is associated with ownership. For example, work
by Hepburn et al. (2010) demonstrates howmechanisms that align in-
centives with resource-extraction externalities could still (though un-
likely) leave the resource stock susceptible to inadvertent collapse in
the presence of hyperbolic discounting. Therefore, even a property
rights-basedmanagement scheme that addresses the common-pool re-
source problem may need to be paired with additional measures in
order to prevent overﬁshing, if the ﬁshers themselves are present-
biased. Interestingly, ﬁshers who more greatly discount the future
have been shown to bemore likely to violate ﬁsheries regulations, espe-
cially if those regulations aren't perceived to be legitimate and the risk
and severity of punishment are low (Akapalu, 2008).
This is not to say that management regimes involving property
rights cannot be effective. In fact there is much evidence that the sus-
tainability of ﬁsheries can be improved by both individual transferable
quotas (Costello et al., 2008) and territorial use rights ﬁsheries (White
and Costello, 2011), given certain ecological conditions and institutional
structures. However, property rights should be implemented within an
overall framework for sustainably managing resource use. When re-
source users are highly present-biased and ﬁnancially constrained, the
odds are stacked against sustainable use. Thus, to lower the chances of
overexploitation, property rights could be paired with some mix of re-
strictions on effort and gears, near-term incentives for sustainable use,
strong enforcement, and robust community buy-in.We suggest that fu-
ture research into themost effective combinations ofmanagement tools
would be an important contribution to the ﬁeld.
Ineffective management of coral reef ﬁsheries can result in over-
ﬁshing, overcapitalization, and low proﬁts (Munro and Scott, 1985);
can facilitate a shift to an algal-dominated ecological state (Hughes,
1994; Knowlton, 2004); and can jeopardize food security (Pauly, 2006;
Sadovy, 2006). It is therefore critical for coral reef management efforts
and for ﬁsheries research to consider how to address the myriad factors
that inﬂuence individuals' resource use patterns, and apply economic
researchwhen endeavoring to better align ﬁnancial incentiveswith sus-
tainability. There is an important role for behavioral economics to play in
developing strategies to sustainably manage ocean resources.
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2014.01.004.
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